


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Demonstration
at ROTC inspection.
1968.



It has been a troubling experience to collect the information for this issue of Chaparral. Usually the military on campus is inconspicuous; easy to ignore. We sought it out.

We found that the University lends direct support through ROTC to the destruction of the people and land of Southeast Asia.

We found that 249 of our fellow students are enrolled in ROTC—most of them to avoid the draft. We found that they suffer some of the same coercive denial of freedom that oppresses all those in the military. We found, however, that the military is offering them a privileged alternative to the draft in exchange for the most efficient utilization of their skills in the continuation of the war.

We found the classrooms, fields and academic credit of Stanford being used to discipline cadets into loyalty and obedience to the military hierarchy. We found that the explicit military tactics used in Vietnam are being taught at a supposedly humane university.

We found the faculty of this University has been pressured into satisfying the terms laid down by the U.S. Army for continuation of ROTC.

We found one source of hope: the people of this community. Their protests against the Vietnam War have been ignored for five years. We hope the community is now ready to end the University's participation in the war and the economic exploitation that caused it.



By PACIFIC STUDIES CENTER

On campus after campus during the last few years, militant struggles have been waged by students demanding an end to the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Partly as a result of such actions, ROTC enrollment is down from last year's level all over the country. Fifty-five colleges and universities have eliminated compulsory ROTC enrollment. Faculties at Yale, Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania, Bowdoin, Washington University, Notre Dame, Massachusetts and other schools have voted to deny academic credit to "military science" courses. Harvard, Dartmouth, Columbia, and Brown are phasing out their ROTC programs completely.

Just how important is ROTC to the U.S. war machine, and what effect will continued student attacks on the program have on this country's ability to wage wars of aggression against the peoples of the Third World? The U.S. intervention in Vietnam has created an acute demand for new junior officers, and ROTC is now the main source of officers for all branches of the Armed Forces. The U.S. government sees American universities and colleges as crucial places from which to recruit youth into the officer corps. For every officer produced by the Service Academies at West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs in 1968, eight were commissioned from the ROTC program. ROTC now produces twice as many career officers for the Army as does West Point.

ROTC units exist on 364 college and university campuses. Total enrollment for the school year 1968-69 was 213,015. More than 23,000 cadets were graduated and commissioned. They accounted for about 50 percent of the Army's new officers, 35 percent of the Air Force's, and 20 percent of the Navy's. (Most of the rest come from 90-day Officer Candidate Schools.)

More than 25 percent of some 400,000 officers now on active duty got their commissions through ROTC. About 85 percent of the Army second

ROTC: The Military

lieutenants and about 65 percent of the first lieutenants now serving in the combat-arms units (Infantry, Armor, Artillery) were commissioned through ROTC.

"Without ROTC," proclaims *Where the Leaders Are*, an Army ROTC recruitment brochure, "the rapid expansion of the American Army during the two World Wars, the Korean conflict and other periods of national crisis would be difficult if not impossible." The bloody involvement in Vietnam is one of those "other periods of national crisis."

ROTC dates back to Civil War days. The Morrill Act of 1862 (also known as the Land Grant Act), provided that tracts of federal land be given to the states for the support and maintenance of at least one college where the main teaching emphasis would be on agriculture, military tactics, and mechanical arts. Most participating schools made military instruction mandatory.

ROTC as it is known today began during World War I with the National Defense Act of 1916. The program consisted of two years of basic training and two years of advanced training, including six weeks of summer camp instruction. While the program came too late to provide officers for World War I, colleges and universities swamped the government with applications requesting ROTC units for their campuses. By 1919, Army ROTC units had been established on 191 campuses. After the war fever quieted down, however, the number fell to 124.

During World War II, more than 100,000 ROTC graduates served as commissioned officers in the Army. But four-year ROTC training program was found to be too slow and Officer Candidate Schools on military bases were established, as in World War I, to assure the rapid training of officers. Since the Korean War the number of officers produced by ROTC has consistently exceeded the output of Officer Candidate Schools.

Nevertheless, ROTC recruitment had lagged by 1964 to the point where the military realized something had to be done. The ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 was designed to make the program more attractive. It included, among other measures, such "material incentives" as a pay increase for all students enrolled in the advanced course of the traditional four-year program. Full-tuition scholarships were offered to cadets. The curriculum was broadened to include more courses in disciplines other than Military Science.

More recently, the Army has begun a two-year program which permits a student who has two years of college remaining to qualify for the advanced course by attending and completing a six-week basic summer camp. A big recruiting drive started for the two-year program, aimed at graduate students who were threatened by the draft.


These measures helped to keep ROTC enrollment at a steady level up through the 1966-67 school year with 266,000 students participating. During the next year, 1967-68, however, enrollment fell 12 percent to 234,000. Last year, the number of students participating declined another 9 percent to 213,000. Preliminary samplings for the current year indicate that enrollment may be down as much as 30 percent—possibly more.

At Stanford, the cadet corps totals 250, down from 346 last year. Last fall, the Army managed to sign up only six freshmen. Army ROTC holds their own only by importing students from nearby junior colleges.

What lies behind the fact that ROTC is declining despite the fact that it offers substantial "material incentives?"

First, students are gambling that they will not be taken from the draft pool this year for military service. In other words, students are taking their chances with the draft rather than enrolling in ROTC.

Second, ROTC enrollment is falling at schools that have made ROTC voluntary rather than mandatory. When the regents at Arizona and Arizona State universities eliminated compulsory ROTC this year, the



Fort Dix stockade. The Army has 15,000 men in prison, according to New Republic magazine.

LNS

Gets What It Needs

rather than again the oppressed. The oppressor is at Stanford, and he is training some of us to defend his overseas interests. The need for education and action is clear.

number of freshmen and sophomores in the program skidded from 5,412 to 1,139.

But there is a more significant reason why ROTC has fallen on hard times. Student struggles being conducted against the program on campuses throughout the country have been effective.

Beginning in 1967 and continuing up until the present, there have been campaigns mounted against ROTC at Stanford, Pratt Institute, Puerto Rico University, Rutgers, Delaware University, Alfred University, San Francisco State, City College of New York, Notre Dame, Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, St. Peter's College, Brown, Washington University, Bowdoin, Princeton, University of Washington, University of Mississippi, Columbia, Buffalo, Boston University, Fordham, George Washington University, St. John's University, Cornell, University of Michigan, Hofstra, MIT, Lincoln University, UCLA, New York University, Massachusetts University, and Tufts University. The Harvard struggle of last spring has been the most noteworthy. Three hundred students occupying the main administration building had to be driven out by 400 club-wielding police.

These struggles serve to hurt ROTC in several ways. First, student protest may lead to actual elimination of the program—as has happened at Harvard, Dartmouth, Columbia, and Brown. (The first three schools witnessed the most militant of the anti-ROTC struggles.) Other schools have denied academic credit to ROTC in response to the growing student pressure. This is usually a serious blow to ROTC, because few students will invest four years in the program unless it will count towards graduation.

Second, identification of ROTC as the agency that actively serves U.S. imperialism has discouraged students from joining the program. More and more students are seeing ROTC as the oppressive institution that it is, and consequently, fewer are joining up. When asked to account for the precipitous decline in ROTC enrollment at Stanford, Colonel S.M. Ramey told the Daily that "anti-war sentiment on campus" was a major reason.

Early in 1969, the Pentagon and various business publications tried to shrug off the growing challenge to ROTC. Said one Pentagon official: "We look for no cutback in the number of ROTC programs, despite all the efforts of the SDS."

U.S. News & World Report noted on May 19, 1969, that ROTC was "under fire but doing fine," adding that "Widespread assaults on ROTC cause little official concern. Officer programs are so popular they are graduating record numbers—and are sought by several hundred more colleges."

The Wall Street Journal observed on July 2 that "Though total enrollment dropped about 35,000 last year to 213,000, the decline looks like a one-shot phenomenon reflecting the abandonment of compulsory training at some schools. The total is expected to climb again in September."

This enrollment decline was not a one-shot phenomenon, and the total did not climb again in September. And now, the establishment is singing a different tune.

The November 3 issue of U.S. News & World Report noted that "ROTC enrollment is down sharply all across the country, partly as a result of militant student demonstrations . . ."

Stanford's vice provost, E. Howard Brooks, pointed out in Campus Report that as school after school denies credit to ROTC, "the DoD is facing the reality of the 'domino theory.'" Brooks emphasized the special importance of ROTC programs at elite schools like Stanford, noting that

the "officers that are turned out by these prestige universities are of very fine quality.

"Already there are stirrings of opposition to ROTC at state institutions," Brooks explained, "and if the prestige schools drop the programs, other schools could well follow suit."

At the height of the anti-ROTC protest last June, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird commissioned a special study of ROTC to be headed by Dr. George C. S. Benson, director of the Defense Department's ROTC office. Sitting on the study committee with Benson, four educators, two generals, and an admiral was Stanford's Brooks.

In a 61-page report released in October, the committee recommended a variety of measures to make ROTC more attractive, including yet another pay increase for cadets and more scholarships, as well as subsidies to participating schools. The committee also recommended that universities in the program make a greater effort to develop "a viable partnership" with the military in improving the corps.

Along with these measures designed to "sweeten" ROTC, the Pentagon is threatening universities that deny credit to the program with complete removal of ROTC units and cutbacks in federal grants.

Clearly the nation-wide attack on ROTC is seen by government and corporate planners as a serious threat to the military's ability to recruit a quality officer corps with the proper-class background.

Sociologist Joseph W. Scott writes in the September issue of *Trans-Action* that "A break between the universities and the military would seriously impair the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and, for that matter, of any major war. By attacking the armed forces' major source of leadership potential, anti-war activists have discovered the most effective method to date for curbing the military establishment's ability to wage war."



LNS



People go to college for different reasons. I went because it was a necessary step between high school and Law School, which was a prerequisite for successful politicians. I chose Stanford because it was the key to breaking into West Coast politics and society. Once there, I joined ROTC because you had to have a service record if you wanted to run for public office.

Also, the ROTC propaganda, the Colonel who rapped at Pre-Reg and the common wisdom all held that the officer route was better than working your way through boot camp. ROTC also made it possible for you to finish college and Law School without ever worrying about the draft—and that was a real advantage for someone with clear career plans and ambitions. Since I was a scholarship student who really couldn't afford Stanford even with scholarships, loans and my part-time jobs, the fact that ROTC paid \$50 a month support was a strong attraction. Of course I'd also heard that the courses were really easy—the best "guts" outside the P.E. department. Twenty-seven units of "A" and "B" on a transcript couldn't hurt, and I felt as insecure about my mind as most freshmen.

So, for the young, not-so-well-off freshman who had seen his less studious high school friends drafted into the Army, ROTC was a natural. The choice of branches was pretty simple. Army was short and simple; the Navy and Air Force took ROTC seriously. I was no more convinced of the sense of going to war than most, so I took Army as the easy compromise.

Signing up was simple. Enduring the classes and all the abuse and worthless drivel was something else. No one at Stanford really thought they were

Recollections

by

Paul Rupert

Shrinking ROTC

Enrollment in Stanford ROTC has declined steadily since the beginning of the Vietnam War, even though the military has stiffened the threat of the draft, fattened the scholarships, and introduced a quickie two-year program aimed at graduate students.

Enrollment figures released by the University show:

	1969	1968
TOTAL	249	346
Army	99	160
Navy	113	141
Air Force	37	45

Last fall, the Army was able to enroll only six Stanford freshmen. To keep the program viable, Army imports 51 junior college students to study and drill with Stanford students.



training for war. We just thought we were doing what you had to do to get through ROTC. The classes were simple, boring, useless. The instructors wanted to treat us like they treat soldiers, but they knew they couldn't really and that we wouldn't probably respond well anyhow. The upperclassmen who led us in drill were even more convinced of our incompetence. For our part, we were convinced that they were pompous, arrogant, silly and a big pain-in-the-ass. We also knew that if we stuck with the program we got to do to other guys what they did to us. A strong incentive, it turns out.

Teaching To Obey

When all is said and done, ROTC existed to teach you to obey, not to fight. In its own limping way, the program tried to break you down and mold you into a good American soldier: one who would follow orders, whatever they may be. To this end we polished buttons, boots and rifles, drilled every week, faced inspections and sat up straight in class. Since they only had us a few hours a week, we failed most litmus tests of perfect obedience—although many of my fellow cadets undoubtedly went on to wage obedient war in Asia.

The Army didn't seem to understand that people fight because they believe in something, not because they are well-trained. Many of us didn't believe the Army's rhetoric enough, and we were sloppy. We studied for finals during breakfast of the exam day. We did as little drilling as possible, praying for rain on drill days. We hoped there wouldn't be time for inspection of our occasionally shined boots and hats.

I might have dropped out of ROTC the first year if it hadn't been for fear, the paratroopers and target practice. The fear—and the promise of financial relief—were the strongest reasons for continuing. I didn't want to screw up my career plans or face the Army from the bottom up. But at times I figured that would be preferable to continuing to waste my time with ROTC.

Then we formed our squad into junior paratroopers and started to do target practice. Our squad leader decided it would be a good thing for our morale to shed the dull greens and get an outfit with a little more appeal. So we got combat boots, ascots, military police belts and holsters, and combat helmets. It appealed to our sense of the heroic, our desire for "machismo." It was a kick to walk around campus on drill day looking like you were just back from the foreign wars. Girls seemed to like our outfits, and that helped morale a lot.

The beginning of target practice and learning to field-strip and clean our rifles added to our rising spirits. It was a little more like the comic books and movies and TV shows made the military out to be. I had always liked target shooting, and even though the instructors were not particularly good, I enjoyed the rifle range. I had never been much on hunting animals, and wasn't all that turned on to the idea of hunting humans, but the distance between the targets and people was easy to maintain on the Stanford range.

My Boots Hurt

But this surge in morale was short-lived. Nothing could really cover the fact that ROTC was a waste of time and humiliating. Besides my new

combat boots hurt. If I stood still for more than a minute my feet killed me. This proved to be my undoing. My attitude had been getting more and more "unhealthy" as the spring went on. On our last day of drill we had a major inspection. Some stiff-assed general from the Presidio came down to look at us. It was unbearably hot, and we were expected to stand at attention for almost an hour while he made his rounds, staring at buttons, belts and what-not.

After the first minute my aching feet began to tell me something. The message was loud and clear, and required a direct violation of orders. We were at parade rest, and were expected to stay there, no matter what. I suppose we were under orders to stay there even if there were an earthquake. At any rate, you always obeyed your commanding officer before your feet.

I did for about twenty minutes. I thought I would hold out until the General got to us, and then split. But the pain was too much. Tears started to form, then engulf my eyes. I wasn't supposed to move my arms, either. I didn't know what the General would think of a perfectly straight-faced cadet with his teeth clenched and tears streaming down his cheek. So after much internal chaos, I walked away and turned my rifle into Lincoln Hall. I realized that this was only a drill, and that I could still come back to ROTC in the Fall. But I also realized that it felt good to walk away from it. The draft and the loss of the money were real problems, but I figured I could learn to live with them somehow.

I can't say I'm sorry about the decision.

"MY BOOTS HURT"



It is said that ROTC must be maintained in order to preserve the "right" of Stanford students to train as officers for the U.S. military. Ironically, ROTC deprives cadets of the freedom to change their minds and quit the program.

By a combination of carrot and stick—generous financial grants and the fear of the draft—students are recruited into ROTC. Once enrolled, they are compelled by the "punitive clause" in their contract to stay in the program and even to follow every military rule and regulation under penalty of immediate induction as enlisted men.

The majority report of last year's Senate ROTC committee said, "To our knowledge, the ROTC contracts are the only University-sponsored and sanctioned contracts on the undergraduate level that bind a student to service."

The coercive nature of ROTC can best be understood in human terms. On page 9, we tell the story of a Stanford student who will be inducted into the Navy because he quit NROTC. The military tries to keep such unpleasant occurrences to a minimum. There are other, quiet ways to maintain satisfactory enrollments even under the stress of the Vietnam War.

The big recruitment drive for all three services—Army, Navy and Air Force—is directed at high school seniors who are going on to college. These 17 and 18-year-olds are at one of the most insecure moments in their lives, filled with worries about proving their worth, being accepted into a new environment, and paying the exorbitant cost of college. The military gives them a plethora of beautiful, four-color brochures that promise to fill all of these needs. "Take Command of Your Future," an Army brochure, tells the high school senior that in ROTC

you will receive training in self-discipline; the techniques of organizing, motivating and managing others; in organizing your own time and activities; and you will develop additional attributes of a leader not generally acquired through other college courses. And you will receive a

tax-free subsistence allowance of \$50 per month during your junior and senior years.

The decisive factor for many students is the offer of a full-tuition scholarship. Along with the fear of the draft, these monetary incentives exert a strong influence.

Hank Liso, a Stanford junior in Army ROTC, signed up for the program as a freshman after spending four years in Junior ROTC at prep school. "I considered leaving the program at the end of two years," says Liso, "when changes in the draft seemed likely. But then I ran into financial difficulties. One of the main things that kept me in the program was the monthly checks."

Scholarship students sign a binding contract with the military at the beginning of freshman year. Recently, however, they were granted the right to quit the program without penalty up to the end of sophomore year. Non-scholarship students sign the contract and become subject to the punitive clause at the start of junior year, and cadets in the new two-year ROTC aimed at draft-threatened graduate students, can still quit after one year. It is this brief grace period that is critical for the military, because the cadet still has the legal freedom to escape ROTC if he is determined to do so. And the thought of quitting occurs to almost every cadet.

"Some time when you're in it you say, I want to get out, this is a crock of shit," says one Navy midshipman. (We would use his name except that NROTC regulations state that "Use of obscenity or profanity" is a class A offense, constituting grounds for involuntary disenrollment.)

When cadets go to their commanding officer to tell him they want to disenroll, it is standard military practice to tell them to go think about it for a while. All kinds of delaying tactics are used, and they often work, because the first two years of the program are fairly lax and non-military. "You are painted the picture of some kind of ideal military system where everybody is following certain rules and everybody has all this respect and

patriotic love of their country and everybody was just so happy about the whole thing," recalls Dan Spivey, a drop-out from NROTC.

Shanghai Mission Accomplished

At the start of the third year, the cadets are sworn into the service and it is too late for any second thoughts. The punitive clause is in effect. The training becomes the "Advanced Course" and is much more serious, including summer tours of basic training at Army camps or aboard ship. Any cadet who talks about dropping out is immediately told that he risks being called up for two to four years as an enlisted man.

"Often it's by going to summer camp for the first time that guys decide they want to quit," says Mark Edwards, a drop-out from Air Force ROTC and military co-counselor for the Special Services office of the University. "They see what the military is really like."

Besides obligating the cadet to stay in the program and accept a commission, the punitive clause requires that he receive passing grades in all his academic and non-academic military training, and follow the personal regulations set down by the military. For instance, all Navy midshipmen are prohibited from marrying.


"A marriage while enrolled in the NROTC program is a breach of contract," says page 30 of the regulations, "and it will be the cause for immediate disenrollment for disciplinary reasons."

The Navy also prohibits a midshipman from majoring in certain disciplines, including art, drama, music and religion. The Air Force ROTC cadet is also restricted to particular majors under the terms of his contract.

After studying the situation, the majority of the Senate ROTC committee wrote:

The punitive clauses operate in relation to academic standards requirements, course of study requirements, conduct requirements, and service requirements... It is this interlocking of contractual requirements, restrictions and obligations that makes the whole much more objectionable than each of its parts might suggest.

How to Shanghai a ROTC Cadet



The military's careful balance of incentives and coercion has enabled ROTC to survive on campuses like Stanford, even under the stress of four years of demonstrations and general revulsion against the Vietnam War. Many cadets have quit the program in defiance of the punitive clause. Some escaped induction, but recently the Defense Department has tightened up and used the punitive clause more consistently.

Dozens of ROTC cadets have applied for conscientious objector status. Since they are officially in the military, cadets must apply through the military channels, rather than the regular draft boards. The military has earned a notorious reputation nationwide for its unjust treatment of CO's, and the same behavior has shown up at Stanford. Co-counselor Mark Edwards decided to seek his own CO discharge from Air Force ROTC while he was serving on the ROTC study committee last year. His religious background clearly qualified him under law. But his first application was summarily turned down by Air Force headquarters in Washington. Edwards' only chance for appeal was to appear before a board of Air Force officers in Washington. He hired a civilian lawyer and flew to the hearing, and finally got his CO. Now he is counselling a dozen men in the service who want a CO.

Kid-Gloves for Stanford

"Guys here in ROTC are treated with kid-gloves compared to enlisted men already in the service," says Edwards. "Stanford people have a much better chance of getting out... they're articulate, they have counselors, and generally they have the money to hire an attorney. If you're an enlisted man, the Army will sometimes shanghai you to Vietnam if you try to apply for CO. That happens a lot."

It isn't surprising that the Senate Committee on ROTC, after witnessing Edwards' plight first-hand, recommended last year that "punitive clauses
(Continued on next page)

The Cost of Changing Your Mind

The Navy is making an example of Doug Mackay.

As punishment for quitting Navy ROTC, the Stanford senior will be ordered up for two years enlisted service in the Navy immediately after he graduates in June. Doug's plight, which is shared by several other Navy drop-outs at Stanford, is well known to every midshipman still enrolled in the program. They know that the same "punitive clause" of their contract applies to them if they resign or "willfully evade" any of the strict ROTC regulations.

Doug signed the contract for NROTC as a 17-year-old fresh out of high school in Woodland Hills. The Navy offered him a full tuition scholarship, and \$50 a month pay. It had the appeal of being a sure draft deferment at a time when student deferments were uncertain. Doug entered Stanford NROTC with enthusiasm, and proved to be a model midshipman.

His doubts about the Navy started "during summer cruise after sophomore year," says Doug. "The summer cruise was



Doug Mackay

bad: it made you feel like a moron half the time or it made you feel like that's what they thought you were, basically." Doug had been placed in command of a platoon of midshipmen. "We were handed these rules, things we had to do. On occasion, we would question a few of them because they seemed kind of ridiculous, and we would obtain no answer other

than 'Well, there are some things you just don't ask any questions about.' Wow! That really bothered me," he says.

"Then there were these lectures that lasted six hours a day, most of which was spent trying to justify the Vietnam War, in a rather unsuccessful fashion. It did just the opposite... The Marine instructor would say sneerfully, 'Communism—now you've heard about that. That's where everybody does their share and they all get back enough to keep them going. Why that sounds pretty good. Well, let me tell you,' he would point out to his sleeping audience, blah, blah. Really ridiculous."

The Vietnam War influenced Doug's disenchantment with the military. "It brought the whole issue of military to mind. I can't relate it to my disenrolling, however."

Doubts or not, Doug won the award for outstanding midshipman after his summer cruise. But he had decided to tell the commander of the Stanford detachment, Marine Colonel Robert Thomas, that he wanted to quit the program, even though he was subject to the punitive clause. He went to speak to Col. Thomas with a friend in NROTC, Dave Easton, who had also decided to resign. "I knew that going into the Navy right after school for any length of time would just destroy me as an individual," says Dave.

Colonel Thomas told both midshipmen to think about it and come back later. Finally, Doug wrote his letter of resignation on May 23, 1968. "They sent my records and everything back to Washington. I waited around for the decision which came to me about the middle of the summer. I was going to be enlisted for two years immediately upon graduation, or sooner if I dropped out of college." Doug had intended to take five years to complete his engineering studies, but the Navy gave him a June, 1970 deadline to graduate. "So I had to double up on my courses so I could get out of here," he says.

Meanwhile, his friend Dave had decided to stick out one more summer cruise before making a final decision. Dave's personal life was in turmoil. His older brother, a draftee at 25, had just been killed in Vietnam. In the middle of his summer cruise, his father died. Dave came back to Stanford in the fall and resigned from ROTC. "I was really uptight about the whole thing," recalls Dave. "Here were all these guys I had liked being around and everything and I knew that guys who dropped out ended up with four years enlistment. But no one was giving me a hard time because of my Dad and my brother."



Dave Easton

After a tense wait, Dave found out that he would escape the punitive clause because the deaths in his family allowed him a "personal hardship" discharge.

Reflecting on his NROTC experience, Dave says: "I spent about two-and-a-half years trying to figure out some way to get out. The unfortunate thing is that they can ask a kid of 17 or 18 to make a fairly steadfast commitment. You can quit at the end of one year, but it's not easy, especially if you're a weak-willed person who got into it in the first place. It takes a lot of courage to go up there and talk to this officer and tell him you want to quit. I think it's unfortunate that it's that binding a thing, so young."

We need ROTC to maintain our strong tradition of civilian influence over the military. Unless officers come from the universities, the professional officer corps may get out of control.



Sound familiar? That's the favorite argument of the apologists for the military presence on campus. The argument raises deep, dark fears in the minds of well-meaning faculty and students, who imagine a military coup that would vanquish our democratic institutions.

There is certainly plenty to fear in the American military. It is absurd, however, to pretend that ROTC, or the draft, for that matter, provide any healthy civilian counterbalance to militarism. On the contrary, the draft and ROTC provide an



Civilian control of the military.

enormously effective means for the militarization of society. They channel a huge supply of young men into uniform, and subject them to military discipline.

Inside the Army, there are no civilians. Disobeying an order results in courtmartial, imprisonment, or, in times of emergency, execution. The whole purpose of ROTC, as outlined in its own manuals, is to train cadets to follow orders and conform to military procedures.

All power within the military hierarchy—all power—rests firmly in the hands of the professional officers, most of whom come from the elite military academies. Any ROTC officer who hopes to make a career of the Army and rise past the rank of captain must become a loyal professional. ROTC graduates in the higher ranks, in fact, have a reputation for striving extra hard to be "tough" disciplinarians, to make up for their lack of a prestigious West Point background.

At the very top of the hierarchy, of course, are civilians—the President, his Cabinet, and the civilians who run the Defense Department. They set the policies that the military obeys. It is these politicians, responsive to the corporate directors of society, who continue the Vietnam War, the draft and the vicious repression of conscientious objectors within the Army. It is civilians who decide to support fascist governments all over the world; and who order the attacks on Black Panthers at home and the careful surveillance of all dissident members of society.

This is fascism. It gains strength from the ability of the government to coerce universities into providing trained manpower and research for war. That's what ROTC is about.

Civilian Control?

Ninety-five "distinguished educators" who have been friendly to ROTC on their campuses visited Fort Lewis ROTC summer camp last year to get a taste of military training. At a plush banquet and other festivities, they renewed their ties to the Sixth Army Command. Stanford engineering dean Larry Wise and history professor David M. Potter attended. ("ROTC Summer Camp 1969, Fort Lewis, Wash., p. 156.")

Punitive Clause

(Continued from previous page)

involving enlisted service be removed." A week later, the Faculty Senate adopted this recommendation and the others by a 25-8 vote.

The Army and Navy then told the University that the punitive clause would remain if ROTC was to stay at Stanford. The punitive clause was a matter of law, the military pointed out, and the Southern-dominated Armed Services Committee would not allow a change in the law.

In the big rush to obey the pro-ROTC resolution of the Board of Trustees, President Ken Pitzer decided that civil liberties for ROTC cadets would have to be indefinitely postponed. "I agree with the Army's judgment that the present congressional climate is definitely not propitious for an effort to secure . . . remedy," Pitzer wrote to the faculty senate last month. "I personally find the Army proposal reasonable and acceptable . . . It is a matter of considerable University interest that a reasonable compromise between the military services and the academic community be reached."



By MACK WHITE

"The Army," said Elvis Presley upon his own discharge, "is a sobering experience."

Oh yes indeed. Many innocent sons of the bourgeoisie exit the Army after two or three years if not an even wiser, then somewhat less innocent.

In the summer of 1958 I had completed two miserable years of college, I had made poor grades, suffered over poor bourgeois poetry (not all of it my own), and had come to my twentieth birthday utterly demoralized and confused. I didn't know where the world was going, not to say myself. I was in bad shape. My father, an Army captain in World War II, suggest I go into the Army. "That'll straighten you out," he grinned.

He did go on to tell me that the Army was really two entirely different worlds, depending on whether you were an officer or an enlisted man. Then he grinned a little wider and said I should probably try to get into OCS as soon as possible. And then he laughed—without any sound—and said, oh well, I would probably live through it.

Well, the old fart was right. I did live through it, and it almost did straighten me out. Almost, but not quite. By the summer of 1960—two years later—I was no longer a confused poet but rather a steel-eyed, solid conservative, headed with iron determination toward business school and a golden career as a capitalist manager.

It's a long story, but three years later there was nothing between me and the cold, cold unemployment office but a thin B.A. in economics. Six months after that I began to truly understand some of the Marx I had read in college.

Looking back on it, I think I had one of two valid reactions to the Army. When you get a really good look at the capitalist class system you either want to 1) get to the top of that system or 2) tear it down. The Army is the sharpest view of bourgeois class society that a son of the bourgeoisie is likely ever to get, and probably the only time in his life he'll get a sustained look at it from the proletarian point of view.

Staggering Revelations

I'm not going to kid you, there are about fifty or sixty staggering revelations in wait for a son of the bourgeoisie in the Army. Probably the most unsettling is the revelation that you have lost your Constitutional rights. And it's official, right there in print: your rights and wrongs are described by an unintentionally comic document called the Universal Code of Military Justice. Article 289 of the UCMJ says something to the effect: "And if what you done wrong ain't covered by the 288 rules above, then its covered by this one."

And believe me, the 288 go into some detail, covering such things as spitting without proper respect in the presence of an officer.

Other important revelations in store for a son of the bourgeoisie are: having to do everything you are told to do or go to jail; such humiliations as having to do 20 push-ups if you fail to do 10 pull-ups which, I once tried to impress upon my sergeant, seemed just backwards to me; and such omnidirectional but, in the long run, debilitating revelations as the Army's tradition of hurry-up-and-wait; full field inspections; and the idea that everything you were doing was pointing toward that fine day when you were going to get your ass shot off.

Somewhere down in this welter is the basic revelation that Army society is strictly divided into two classes. The upper class are called gentlemen and the lower class men. Or officers and enlisted personnel. Most of the men seemed to take their situation with good humor. Some sergeants even like it, viz. Burt Lancaster in *From Here To Eternity*. "Don't call me sir," sergeants

'The Old Fart Was Right'



growl at a green recruit, "I WORK for a living."


Well, you DO call the guys who don't work for a living "sir" and you salute them, or as some of the more candid officers admit, you salute their uniforms.

And of course, there are other class differentiations. Officers and enlisted men live in different quarters, eat different chow, wear different uniforms, are judged by different standards, and, of course, do different kinds of work. At first most of this saluting and saluting doesn't seem all that important. There are other things to worry about. Sometime after you leave basic, when you get to your regular outfit—the humiliation and the degradation of the Army class system begin to take effect. By the time I got out of the Army I was saying "sir" through clenched teeth. My hand trembled with rage after every salute. It was a bad feeling, living life as a second class citizen.

But when I got out of the Army, I was once again the son of the bourgeoisie. I wasn't a black man or a worker or a member of the Third World. As I said before, I had a choice and, not being too bright at the time, I decided to go with what I considered my class system, get on top, and get as much out of it as I could. That lasted for a while, longer than I would like to admit, but finally I began to see that being a better bourgeois wasn't the answer—not for me in particular and certainly not for the world in general—so I began, like a lot of other sons of the bourgeoisie before me, the long struggle toward a classless society.

Along about this time—a couple of years after I got out of the Army—I remember seeing a German movie about Hitler's last days in his command bunker in Berlin. I remember it as a good, anti-military movie with Oscar Werner as the protagonist, an idealistic German lieutenant. At the end, Oscar is disillusioned and dying and he has some last words for the German youth. I have since learned that, though this is only a beginning, it is a good beginning.

"Never say 'yes sir' again," Oscar told me, and I haven't.



availability of the agent, means of delivery (either ground or air), and the imagination of the commander and his staff."

The next page of the manual's CBW section explains how "the agent may be used to make fortified positions untenable and to flush the occupants into the open where they may be captured or destroyed." The manual also outlines the "use of chemical anti-plant agents to defoliate vegetation restricting observation and fields of fire," and "use of biological or chemical anti-plant agents to destroy food-producing crops."

This kind of biological warfare has caused permanent harm to the ecology of Vietnam.

The same manual teaches the future officers about the tactic of "Reconnaissance by Fire," which has been blamed for the frequent slaughter of Vietnamese civilians by U.S. artillery and helicopters. On page 13 of the latest revision, the manual says "Reconnaissance by fire is accomplished by firing on likely or suspected enemy positions in an attempt to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or firing . . . positions being reconnoitered must be continuously observed so that any enemy movement or return fire will be definitely located."

Besides this counterinsurgency course, the emphasis on Vietnam has extended to other classroom work. Map reading classes, for instance, now practice their skills on Army maps from South Vietnam. The steady stream of military guest speakers and Army films at the ROTC classes dwell more and more on the biggest "job" now confronting the military: the conquest of Vietnam.

Training in the Field

Stanford ROTC hasn't confined Vietnam training to the classroom. The monthly Army field drills, conducted in the foothills just behind campus, concentrate on small unit infantry patrols like those in Vietnam. Students in full battle gear fire blank ammo from M-14's to simulate a real battle. For cadets who want extra training, Captain Clinton Anderson leads a voluntary unit called the "Stanford Rangers."

As noted on page 10 of the Stanford Army ROTC Cadet Guide,

Stanford Rangers, a counterinsurgency unit, is open to any ROTC cadet. Weekly meetings are held. Instruction is given in counterinsurgency, map reading, patrolling, hand to hand combat, physical training and communications. There is also a weekend problem per quarter combining the above subjects.

About 25 students now belong to the Rangers and earn merit points for their participation. During their last field trip to Ford Ord army base, the Rangers practiced with live M-14 ammunition on human-shaped targets. At an earlier excursion to Hunter Liggett Army base, they learned the latest techniques for combat use of chemical gases, according to one Ranger. The next field trip will be to Fort Ord on March 6-7. All Army cadets, Ranger or not, have been encouraged to go along to build their "confidence" for summer camp.

The six-week summer camp, at Fort Lewis, falling between the junior and senior year, is the high point of the conditioning of the future officers. The entire third-year classroom series, presently called "Principles of War, Military Leadership, and Tactics," is designed to familiarize the cadet with the drills and weapons of summer camp.

Like the rest of ROTC, summer camp has been adapted to prepare the cadets for Vietnam. A special drill called "VC Village" has the cadets conduct a search and destroy mission in a mock Vietnamese village (see photo), complete with "villagers" played by other cadets. Another drill teaches the cadets how to protect themselves while using chemical gases (see photo).

And naturally the future officers get extensive drill in the use of the M-16 automatic rifle, the principal U.S. infantry weapon which was designed especially for Vietnam.

As the U.S. Army continues to gain experience in fighting to suppress revolutions such as those in Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Guatemala, and Santo Domingo, the ROTC program can be expected to put still more emphasis on counterinsurgency. Army documents state that the mission of ROTC is "to procure and produce junior officers who . . . are suitable for continued development as officers in the Army." That means the Army will teach them what's needed, with no questions asked.




VIETNAM
WILL WIN



"President Kenneth S. Pitzer of Stanford University said Tuesday that he thinks compromise is the way to get maximum happiness and minimum pain in the Stanford community.

"His backing of academic credit for Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) courses represents a compromise with the feelings of alumni, trustees and outside friends of Stanford, Pitzer said during a campus interview."

Palo Alto Times, January 28, 1970



Last November 6, the members of the newly-appointed President's Advisory Committee on ROTC Affairs were surprised by an unexpected visitor at their second meeting. It was Ken Pitzer himself. He had important business.

Two weeks earlier, the U.S. Army had sent a formal memorandum to Pitzer announcing that it would not accept the faculty's decision in February, 1969, to remove all academic credit from ROTC, abolish the punitive clause in student contracts, and deny faculty privileges to Army officers. The Army insisted that all these things be restored, although it did agree to change a few procedures to make it look like ROTC was reformed.

Pitzer came right out and told the Advisory committee that he wanted their endorsement of the Army proposal. According to the minutes of the meeting,

President Pitzer then discussed the importance of the ROTC question to many members of the Stanford community, including Trustees and alumni... He also reported conversations with various Defense officials, including Mr. (David) Packard, and commented on difficult congressional attitudes, noting that the chances are decidedly dim for legislative correction of such problems as the 'punitive clauses' in individual contracts.

Several members of the committee protested that they thought the committee's purpose was to implement the Senate's decision on ROTC, not to reverse it. Pitzer denied that he was asking for a reversal. He would later write to the faculty, "I find the Army proposal very close indeed to the recommendations adopted by the Senate..."

Pitzer eventually got what he wanted, although the chairman of the committee, Professor Alan Manne, resigned in protest. The Faculty Senate also accepted the Army's proposal by a 23-13 vote, on January 22.

Usually Pitzer gets what he wants from the faculty through a more gentle kind of persuasion. The chips were down on the ROTC issue, however, and there was no time for prolonged discussion. Pitzer had learned from his employers, the Board of Trustees, that ROTC had to stay on terms acceptable to the military.

The Trustees made their views known just one month after the faculty's 1969 action against ROTC. In a resolution, the Trustees said,

ROTC is vital to the continued supply of civilian leadership for the military services, and it is of crucial importance that first-ranking institutions, such as Stanford, lead their strength to that task... this board of trustees urges the president of the university to continue his consultation with the Department of Defense, leading to appropriate actions which will improve and vitalize this important program.

The pressure on Pitzer was stepped up by the Southern congressmen who control the House Armed Services Committee. On September 23, they attached an amendment to a military appropriation bill that required any school receiving Defense Department (DOD) research grants to file a statement "summarizing the record of the university with regard to cooperation on military matters such as ROTC." A subcommittee report also recommended that all DOD money be cut off to any university which would not renew its ROTC contract with the Army, on terms acceptable to the Army.

The amendment was not passed by the U.S. Senate, but the threat in itself was sufficient to ensure Pitzer's full cooperation. Stanford had \$17 million in DOD contracts. As Vice Provost Howard Brooks told the *Daily* on October 7, "We're all very worried about this threat of retaliation for an attitude against ROTC."

Brooks had not given up hope, however. He told *Campus Report*, "I think the DOD is willing to examine and review all the university contracts that exist, will take a broad view of them, and then give the colleges an opportunity to come up with something the armed services can live with."

The Army did indeed try to be understanding. It agreed to give up the title of "Department" in exchange for "Center for Military Studies." Army officers would give up their votes on the Academic Council, but they would keep all other faculty privileges. And the Army announced that it was prepared to have its basic courses in military history and "Foundations of National Power" taught by the history and political science departments, respectively. In addition, it would transfer the less "academic" training in other

courses to non-credit activities like summer camp, and then submit each of its own courses for approval by the Committee on Undergraduate Studies.

The punitive clause would have to stay, however. Congress didn't want to change the law, and the Army and Navy would be the last people to insist that they do so.

With the heat on, Pitzer had a difficult task before him. He did his best.

Compliance from the Advisory Committee was not hard to get, despite the stubborn resistance of chairman Manne and history professor Lyman Van Slyke, the only carry-over from the old Senate committee which recommended stripping ROTC of all academic privileges. Pitzer had ensured that the other three professors on the committee, appointed in June, were pro-ROTC (one had actively campaigned for reversal of the Senate's decision by the Academic Council). Of the three students on the committee, two were ROTC cadets. Pitzer won by 6-2.

A Senate meeting was immediately scheduled. Pitzer explained to the faculty in a January 16 letter, "there is some urgency since the three services need to know whether or not they can enroll scholarship students in the coming Fall term."

"The Army has offered substantial concessions to the University and seems to me to have met virtually every requirement except on the matter of individual student contracts," Pitzer said, somewhat plaintively.


And the Army officers would no longer be real faculty, Pitzer pointed out, so there could certainly be no objection to keeping them around. "A group analogous to the military officers assigned to ROTC duty at Stanford might well be the members of the Stanford United Ministry who perform various campus services while basically employed by organizations or institutions other than the University..."

"I strongly urge favorable Senate consideration," he concluded.

With reasoning like this, Pitzer won a 23-13 victory in the Faculty Senate. And last week he declared the debate closed. No "constructive purpose" could be served by a community forum on ROTC, he told the *Daily*.

Pitzer had done his job.

Washington Growls,



Pitzer Jumps

'You Are Under Observation At All Times'

"Drill is an important means available to the Commanding Officer to assess each Midshipman's qualifications for and aptitude toward a military environment. It is a constructive teaching device available to develop and instill in Midshipmen an appreciation for responsibility and certain principles of leadership . . ." (Stanford NROTC Regulations, p. 17.)



The controversy about academic credit for ROTC has obscured the fact that the most effective parts of the program, for the military, have never received credit. The cadets are graded, drilled and tested in dozens of ways outside of the classroom, and it is this total process of conditioning that the military wants to keep.

The transmission of knowledge is not, of course, the primary purpose of ROTC. For the Army, that purpose is "to procure and produce junior officers," according to official documents, and this requires a program that will build loyalty to the military service.

Mark Edwards spent three years in Air Force ROTC before obtaining a CO discharge. He served as a student member of the Senate ROTC committee and is now military counselor in the Special Services office of the University. Edwards puts a wealth of experience behind his comments on ROTC.

"Having the guy under control for two years or four years will make him more loyal to the service," explains Edwards. "The most important result of summer camp, for instance, is to increase loyalty. A guy gets to feel that it must be worthwhile being an officer if you're willing to go through all this . . ."



"Many cadets say the most denigrating thing about the programs is that you have to pretend that you're enthusiastic about it all a 'red-hot soldier.' That's why they grade you on 'leadership potential' and 'attitude,'" says Edwards.

The academic credit issue is completely irrelevant, Edwards feels. "The military can always work it out so that their courses have sufficient academic content or their instructors have enough education. The real issue is the outside control."

The philosophy of building loyalty is best explained by the military itself, on page 7 of the *Stanford Army ROTC Cadet Guide*:

Military discipline has many forms, but the purpose of all is the same: to make sure that the soldier is so well trained that he will carry out orders quickly and intelligently even under the most difficult conditions. Good military discipline is a habit you must start forming the day you enter the ROTC.

It is the small things, the innumerable details of regimentation, that the military imposes on cadets to instill discipline. Each ROTC department is organized as a military unit, with cadet officers who have responsibility for drilling and evaluating younger cadets. The Army, for example, has a senior cadet evaluate each third-year cadet on a form called "Pre-Summer Camp Observation

Report," which has rankings for Appearance, Enthusiasm, Loyalty, Attitude, and a long list of other "leadership qualities."

The regimentation is extended as far as conditions on campus will allow. Until last year, all cadets were required to wear their uniforms at all times on campus on a certain day of the week. The *Stanford Army ROTC Cadet Guide* warns (page 9), "Cadets should be aware of the fact that they are under observation at all times when members of the cadre or senior cadets are present. Their reputation stems from all of their actions and activities (or inactivity)."

The largest ROTC department, the Navy, with 113 midshipmen, has both the soundest academic courses and the most strict rules for students. The *Stanford NROTC Regulations* stipulate (page 23),

"Midshipmen shall maintain the highest standards of personal appearance, both while in uniform and in civilian attire. Always remember, you are representing the United States Navy, in uniform and out . . ."

The Navy has a long list of forbidden activities, prefaced by the comment (page 26), that "The end product of the NROTC program is a mentally, physically and morally well-developed officer for the Naval Service. The conduct standards are, in

general, those standards by which the Midshipman will be judged when he enters into active duty . . ."

Among the "class A" offenses, which are grounds for probation discipline or even disenrollment, are

"Joining subversive or otherwise unauthorized associations."

"Use of obscenity or profanity."

"Insubordination."

Class "B" offenses, which are punished by the senior midshipmen themselves, include

"Unmilitary or improper conduct."

"Making frivolous statement or request."

"Improper hair cut."

"Improper shave."

As a matter of military policy, the "attitude" of a cadet is taken into account in determining his course grade for any ROTC class. "The grade will also reflect (the) military department evaluation of how well the individual has demonstrated desirable personal attributes of an officer," says page 8 of the *Cadet Guide*. In May, 1966, a controversy arose at Stanford when it became known that freshman cadets were being offered higher ROTC grades if they would give blood in a drive to support U.S. troops in Vietnam.

(Continued on next page)



"There might be conditions where I would disobey orders... but I can't really say now. I know that when I get in, I will most likely conform."

Army ROTC cadet

(Continued from previous page)

Besides the academic grades, ROTC maintains its own grading system of merits and demerits, which go on to the cadet's permanent military record. The Navy says that "all midshipmen are expected to participate in and seek positions of leadership in extracurricular activities," and offers one to four merit points per quarter for such things as student government, freshman sponsor, the *Stanford Daily* staff, and so on. In such extracurricular activities, however, the midshipman must act in a manner acceptable to his commanding officers. "It is emphasized that the participation is concerned with activities which relate in a significant way to 'officer-like' qualities," state the *Stanford NROTC Regulations* (page 26). Presumably a midshipman would not earn merit points for helping publish this issue of *Chaparral*. It might constitute a "class A" offense, in fact, since we probably qualify as a "subversive or otherwise unauthorized association."

The little things add up. Dan Spivey, a drop-out from NROTC after two years, explains:

I found that the program tried to stifle me. That was part of the intent of the program—to mold me into a certain preconceived idea to mold my personality into what someone else had judged to be that of an ideal officer. And so you were supposed to consider yourself to be a midshipman regardless of where you were, rather than considering yourself to be a human being.

The epitome of the conditioning is drill, which is naturally mandatory for all ROTC students. The Navy still relies on the traditional close-order marching every Monday to instill the right attitude in the midshipman. But change has come to the Army's drill, which has been renamed "Leadership Lab." For third-year cadets, who are being prepared for six weeks of summer camp, this means realistic battle maneuvers in combat dress, conducted in the foothills just behind campus.

"Most guys probably think it's corny like I do," says one third-year Army cadet who did not want his name used, "but it's funny—the guys really put out at these things. They hit the dirt, they make noises like firing... maybe we're trying to impress the officers who are watching us."

When questioned about such things as the My Lai massacre, this cadet replied, "When you're in the Army, you have to learn to do what you're told. I'm not going to change things, but I might make things better for people."

"There might be conditions where I would disobey orders... but I can't really say now what they would be," he said. "I know that when I get in, I will most likely conform."

When ROTC is viewed as a four-year or two-year conditioning process, the question of academic credit is seen to be trivial. Two or three units for one course per quarter is all that is involved. Academic credit became a key issue when the military decided to insist that it be continued, even after the faculty senate had unequivocally voted last year to remove it from any "programs of military training and education."

Navy headquarters told Stanford, "Academic credit is necessary for a viable NROTC program. To accept a 'no credit' situation would be an acknowledgement by the Navy that NROTC is inappropriate for a college campus."


To the military, academic credit is regarded as an extra aid in recruiting undergraduates, especially in face of declining enrollments. The military has no quarrel with the University




demanding "strict academic quality" in the courses, because for many years the services have been making the courses more academically respectable by shifting much of the role learning to non-credit training or summer camp. The Navy, for instance, shifted "damage control and firefighting" from the classroom to the summer cruise in 1968. The military is also quite happy to substitute legitimate academic courses from other departments for its own requirements. The University administration has helped persuade the political science and history departments to prepare acceptable substitute courses in "National Security" and "Military History," respectively. Army regulations insist, however, that an officer "monitor" substitute classes "to assure compliance with the objective" of ROTC.

None of these "reforms" will necessarily limit the effectiveness of ROTC in training officers. They might make the programs more attractive to students, in fact.

Mark Edwards brushes the credit issue aside when discussing ROTC. "The University is acting as a conditioning ground for these people into loyalty and willingness to follow orders. That's a simple fact. I consider it the University's responsibility to be humane, and it's not humane to train officers."



People this issue: Ann Denton, Steve McChrystal, Duarnuid McGuire, Jim Shoeb, John Shoeb, Chris Squires, Michael Sweeney and Wally Thurston. We dedicate this issue to the thousands of Vietnamese people who have been murdered by the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force, and to the 45,000 Americans whose lives were wasted in the service of U.S. imperialism.



(Tom Connolly, professor of mechanical engineering and chairman of the original ROTC study committee, wrote this reply to a KCBS radio editorial in February, 1969, which attacked the Senate's withdrawal of credit from ROTC.)

Our committee did indeed state that "... the ROTC departments are, by their nature, incompatible with the University's primary commitment to unrestricted creation and dissemination of knowledge..." A short example may make the point. An Army lieutenant was recently court-martialed for taking part in a peaceful demonstration opposing U.S. policy in Vietnam. A military officer is not free to express publicly opposition to many aspects of U.S. policy. Does KCBS find it compatible with its concept of a university that faculty members must place their careers in jeopardy or risk imprisonment in order to make profession of a legitimate position in their field? This is precisely the position of the military officers of the ROTC department faculty. This fact represents one basis for our finding of incompatibility between ROTC departments and the University.



but has a positive obligation to speak out against the commission of such crimes by any organization with which he is connected.

It is a bitter thing for one who has served with pride in the armed forces of our nation, and who has tried to contribute to world peace by research intended to strengthen our military establishment, to have to admit to himself that those armed forces are now committing war crimes, and that the nuclear deterrent intended to stigmatize the use of force is being used instead as a shield under which to conduct aggressive war. Yet I can no longer conceal these facts from myself. I beg all of you to face them resolutely.

We know of colleagues in the Soviet Union who have taken steps opposing the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia and the aberrations of their own military-industrial complex. This takes considerable courage in the USSR, and many of them are paying the price for it. This should shame us into action in a country where non-violent opposition is still sometimes respected. Certainly any action we can take here opposing war and the growing trend toward a police state will strengthen the hand of those in the USSR who are opposing militarism in their own country, just as their actions can show us where our own duty lies.

The application of the Nuremberg precedent here at Stanford seems clear. As members of the Academic Council of this institution, we have not only a moral but also a legal obligation to refuse cooperation with the military operations of the United States Government, including the recruitment of officer corps via ROTC, or the conduct of military research whether classified or not.

Some Faculty Opinions

February 9, 1970

From: Pierre Noyes, Professor at SLAC

To: Members of the Academic Council

Subject: The Nuremberg precedent and Stanford University

Some of us have been aware for years that many of the actions of the United States armed forces in Vietnam constitute war crimes in clear violation of both international and domestic law. Others, like myself, have only gradually become aware of this fact. Even now that the allegations of the massacre at My Lai have been spread in glowing color across the pages of the mass media, some still cling to the illusion that this was an isolated incident rather than an illustrative example of a policy which "... must be minimally construed as tending toward being genocidal in character..." to quote a distinguished international lawyer in our own *Journal of International Studies*. Allegations of a wide variety of such treaty violations have been provided for 1965, 1966, and the first half of 1967 in S. Melman's *In The Name of America*, and at the Stockholm war crimes "trial," the transcript of which was presented to our Government. Failure to investigate these grave breaches of the laws of war is itself a violation of articles 129 and 146 of the Geneva Convention (signed 1949, effective 1956). Under Article VI of our constitution this treaty is the supreme law of our country, and is so presented in the legal manuals of the U.S. armed forces.

The Treaty of London which set up the Nuremberg tribunal was specifically intended to provide a precedent for the enforcement of extant international law as applied to individuals. To quote Supreme Court Justice Jackson "... if certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us." The position developed in these and other war crimes trials was that any individual with a "substantial moral choice" must not only refuse to cooperate in the execution of war crimes,



(Holt Ashley, professor of aeronautics and astronautics, wrote the following as part of a statement to the faculty a year ago. Ashley voted in favor of the majority report on ROTC in 1969. He supported President Pitzer's recent reversal of that decision, however, because it "went 80 percent in my direction, so I voted for it.")

I believe that many of the serious mistakes in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy since about 1950—in particular the adoption of a role described as "policeman to the world"—have been exacerbated by the disproportionate, easy access that the armed services have had to the nation's pool of youthful manpower. Our current grievous involvement in Vietnam is, in part, due to this ready supply of young men. Enlisted personnel can be acquired, as needed, through Selective Service and officers through such mechanisms as the presently-constituted ROTC programs. It is personally distressing to me that Stanford should actively and institutionally participate in the latter process. There is little that the university can do about Selective Service, except to protest the damage that is being done in the area of graduate education. We do have the opportunity, however, to make our views felt by substantial action in the case of ROTC.

From the recommended decisions I see no harm whatever to the vital national defense posture, the word "defense" being construed in its dictionary sense. I believe that small, technologically-specialized, highly-trained, voluntarily-recruited military services are fully capable of maintaining the necessary strategic force: the "credible strategic deterrent," "counter-force capability," "second-strike capability," and the like. These are the military activities which prevent the unthinkable occurrence of a third world war. They also provide an excellent basis from which to carry on arms-limitation and disarmament negotiations.



Your Tuition Subsidizes ROTC



You probably know that ROTC, like the rest of our massive war effort, is supported by your tax money. But you probably didn't know that your Stanford University tuition is also used to help pay for the program.

The subsidy comes in office space and a wide variety of services.

The present contract between Stanford and the Department of the Army establishing an ROTC Army unit was signed by Alf Brandin, Vice President for Business Affairs, on March 15, 1965. The Army has contracted "to establish and maintain a senior division unit of the Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps," and agrees to provide uniforms and pay, as well as scholarships to "specially selected members" of the program.

In return, the university agrees "to establish a Department of Military Science" and "to grant appropriate academic credit." In addition, however, Stanford is obligated "to make available to the Department of Military Science the necessary classrooms, administrative offices, office equipment, storage space, and other required facilities in a fair, and equitable manner in comparison with other departments of the institution."

In addition, the contract stipulates that Stanford will "maintain an enrollment of one hundred in the basic course," which includes

students from Stanford, Foothill College, Menlo College, DeAnza Junior College, Canada College, and the College of San Mateo. There is now some question, however, whether the Army will be able to sustain enrollment at this level in the face of rising disenchantment with the Vietnam war and subsequent declining enrollment.

The Air Force and Navy programs benefit similarly from Stanford's generosity.

In considering this financial burden to the university, the Ad Hoc Senate Committee on ROTC (in the Majority Report issued February 7, 1969) warned that "It should be recognized that these arrangements result in a Stanford subsidy to the ROTC programs. Stanford is obliged to provide facilities, services, and financial support to the ROTC programs on a cost-free basis."

The committee recommendations also indicated that ROTC, in attempting to counter some of the criticism of their courses by allowing students to enroll in substitute courses within the university, was merely asking the university to pay an additional indirect subsidy. "An increase in course substitution, while desirable in some ways, will increase the subsidy by relieving the ROTC programs of that part of their instructional requirements."

The report concluded that, "In the Majority's view, such subsidies of the armed forces are

inappropriate."

In recent years, Stanford has also been forced, by the terms in their contracts, to allocate large additional sums of money to provide for capital improvements in the quarters of the ROTC units. In the spring of 1968 an unidentified but action-oriented opponent of ROTC expressed his discontent over the presence of Naval ROTC at Stanford by twice firebombing their headquarters.

Subsequently, the University graciously agreed to finance the complete remodeling of a portion of Lucina Hall, to be used as classroom space for the use of ROTC. In fiscal years 1968 and 1969, the University spent a total of \$120,000 to provide the Navy with new quarters at Stanford.

It is difficult to find out the exact amount spent in providing facilities and utilities for the armed services here at Stanford since the total is included in the administrative budget of the school of Humanities and Sciences.

Other universities have attempted to force the Department of Defense to assume these burdens. In September 1969 students at the University of Michigan began a campaign to "totally eliminate" ROTC by disrupting ROTC classes and occupying a building.

Three months later the Board of Regents, in voting unanimously to renegotiate Michigan's contract with the Defense Department, "... called upon the Defense Department to reimburse the university for full cost of the ROTC program... Direct and indirect subsidies, including secretarial support and classroom and office space to the three corps programs total about \$250,000." (New York Times, December 21, 1969.)

The Special Committee on ROTC appointed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in June, 1969 recommended "that the federal government pay for institutional costs of ROTC," but Laird has refused to approve that recommendation.

At the same time that Stanford pays part of the cost of training military personnel, the gap between Stanford's income and expenditures continues to widen. Between now and 1973, the university will be forced to reduce the budget base by \$2.5 million, while utilizing several million additional dollars from previously uncommitted reserves. But it looks like the ROTC subsidy will continue.

And next year your tuition goes up to \$2400.



The Navy ROTC building at Stanford was destroyed by a firebomb in May, 1968.

Stanford Workers and the War

By Pacific Studies Center

Workers and students at Stanford are fighting the same battle. But few of them know that, and few know each other. The chances are that neither group will make any real gains until they unite.

Students are fighting against the Vietnam war and, in a larger sense, against the destructive economic forces that produced the war. So they resist the militarization of their own lives and try to prevent, individually and collectively, the oppression of others. For example, during the April 3rd Movement last year, many Stanford students put themselves on the line in an attempt to get Stanford and the Stanford Research Institute out of Southeast Asia.

But students do not always see their struggle against oppression as having anything to do with the problems of workers in the United States. The students are constantly told that workers have a soft life. They are "just fighting for more economic gains."

So every day students walk past working people—janitors, plumbers, electricians, laborers, gardeners, clerks, secretaries—without seeing them at all, much less as potential allies. There are about 7,000 of these invisible people at Stanford.

The privilege question cuts both ways. Workers see clearly that students can demonstrate against the war and fight the system because they do not have to support themselves. Workers do not necessarily resent this. In fact many of them admire student idealism and militancy. But if workers fight, it has to be to keep their jobs. Most of them have families to feed, house and clothe, and no one is offering them any fellowships or allowances.

In the past year or so, Stanford workers have increasingly felt the need for some kind of power. Most of them are fed up with the company-oriented Stanford Employees Association (SEA). As one disgruntled maintenance man says, the most militant thing SEA ever did was buy a flagpole for the University.

Employees Organize

Employees are moving in two directions. One group formed United Stanford Employees (USE) which, although independent of any outside union, has been much more forceful than SEA in taking grievances to the administration and raising demands for housing and other benefits. USE publishes a newspaper, *Employees Organize*, which recently published university wage scales and job classifications. Workers had previously found great difficulty in obtaining this information and determining if they were paid fairly for the job they were doing.

Other employees, most of them in the physical plant division which maintains Stanford's buildings and grounds, feel that they must go further. They have concluded that the university will not give them an even break until they have a labor contract and the power to back it up. So they are organizing themselves into a local of the Teamsters Union.

Stanford refuses to bargain with what it calls an "outside group," so the Teamsters have carried the case to the National Labor Relations Board. They hope that the government will force the University to recognize them as bargaining agent for the organized workers.

One important factor is that not all the workers want the same thing. The gardeners and laborers, for example, need more money. The University recently raised their minimum wage to a pitiful \$400 a month. But in the case of unskilled workers (many food service employees also fall into this category), the minimum does not apply because the workers are kept on an hourly wage. People who are paid by the hour are not eligible for retirement or other benefits, which makes their work cheaper still. And if the University decides to lay them off (as in the case of Treadder employees over Christmas), there is no obstacle to cutting off their wages.




Photo by John Shoch

But many of the skilled workers—craftsmen in the physical plant, clerks and secretaries with special skills—are paid something close to what they would get elsewhere. For example Stanford pays its electricians between \$780 and \$856 a month, while maintenance electricians in the Bay Area average \$773 a month.

No Job Security

These people have other grievances. First, they do not have any real job security, because they do not have a contract. In the past, Stanford could afford to be paternalistic and not lay many men off. It appears that the age of paternalism is ending. In December, the carpenters and painters were told that they were not sufficiently productive, that an outside contractor would be hired to do the work, that both shops might be closed up by the first of the year. Although no men were actually fired, many of them quit, hoping to find steady work elsewhere.

Since Stanford is a non-profit institution, its workers are not eligible for unemployment compensation if they are fired or laid off.

The situation of older workers is most precarious. If they are laid off, it is usually impossible for them to find employment elsewhere. There are just too many younger men competing for the same jobs. And they face the prospect of retirement without an adequate pension. Older workers tell the story of one man who wanted to retire after 48 years service to the University and was offered \$120 a month. He had to keep working.

Al Freitas, who has worked for Stanford for 34 years puts it this way: "The main bone of contention is fringe benefits. I signed up with the Teamsters. I like their medical plan, their dental and retirement plans. They so far outclass ours that it's pitiful. But I don't see the University picking up the tab for this kind of thing."

The underlying reason for Stanford's stinginess with its workers appears to lie in the University's relationship to Washington. Stanford depends heavily on government money—from the Department of Defense, the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation—not only to finance research but also to pay for other operating expenses through "indirect cost recovery." Research grants were cut by about \$2 million last year, \$2 million this year and will fall another \$3 million in the next fiscal year, as a direct result of Nixon's attempt to balance the budget while continuing to fight the Vietnam war. In order to keep some research going, the University has been spreading its budget more thinly. Among other things, this means that employees are going to have problems getting what they need.

This is what Ken Pizer meant when he wrote Rudy Thom of Teamsters Local 856 that "the University administration believes that any problems or questions affecting its employees can be satisfactorily resolved within the University community itself by the employees and the administration without need of participation by an outside organization such as your Union." As long as Stanford employees do not have the power to bargain collectively and enforce their will, the University can "satisfactorily" hold their wages down and refuse to pay for other benefits. The money thus saved will help support research that the military and other government agencies are no longer so willing to pay for.

This means that workers are the ones who are forced to pay for inflation. It is not corporations or universities who are suffering under Nixon's war austerity plan; it is workers who either find themselves out of a job or see their wages held down while the cost of living goes up six percent a year.

This is exactly what is happening at Stanford right now. Many of the laborers and gardeners find

it impossible to support their families on what the University pays them. They have to take a second job just to get by.

Supervision, Military Style

In addition to its financial ties to the Defense Department, Stanford is militarized in another way that affects workers directly. Many of the supervisors and administrators are retired officers. The University advertises especially to hire these men because, with their military pensions, they will accept smaller salaries. For example, Colonel Elbridge Bacon, the widely disliked supervisor of the physical plant, came to Stanford after 21 years with the Army. Many of his assistants also have military backgrounds.

"Employees have two kinds of gripes about these supervisors. One is that they do not know their jobs. 'In the old days the foremen had backgrounds in plumbing, carpentry or whatever,'" says one old-timer. "But Bacon is an authority on delegating authority. If you ask me, they are square pegs in round holes."

Another is that military men tend to have an attitude toward discipline and a way of relating to their subordinates that the workers resent. There are stories of men who have been summarily sent home and docked pay for minor offenses. As one young employee says, "I don't think that they have any respect for the worker. They treat him like he's just another number."


The direct concerns of workers—wages, benefits, job security—are related to the same things that concern students. Workers' problems are created by a militarized, imperialist economy that is oriented toward expansion and exploitation rather than the welfare of human beings. Students fight militarism and imperialism by attacking war-related research and ROTC, while workers struggle against the same forces by trying to improve their own wages and conditions. Everyone has an interest in ending Stanford's participation in the military machine.



WORK

STUDY

**GET
AHEAD**



KILL